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I n a list of twelve stylistic and grammatical errors of oratory, the fourth-century grammarian Donatus includes the fault of amphibolia, a transliteration of a Greek word that Donatus further 
defines as an ambiguitas dictionis.1 This understanding of ambiguitas 
dictionis as a flaw in composition is unique neither to the texts of late 
antiquity nor to technical grammatical treatises, and one can find 
ample cautioning against it in pedagogical texts both before and 
after Donatus.2 In his first-century Institutio Oratoria, for instance, 
Quintilian similarly cautions against writing ambiguous language 
and encourages his students to compose lucid and straightforward 
Latin, particularly in regard to syntax. As part of his manual for the 
instruction of the ideal orator, Quintilian advises that
vitanda in primis ambiguitas, non haec solum, de cuius 
genere supra dictum est, quae incertum intellectum 
facit, ut ‘Chremetem audivi percussisse Demean,’ sed 
illa quoque, quae etiam si turbare non potest sensum 
in idem tamen verborum vitium incidit, ut si quis 
dicat visum a se hominem librum scribentem. nam 
etiam si librum ab homine scribi patet, male tamen 
composuerit, feceritque ambiguum quantum in ipso 
fuit. (8.2.16)
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Above all, ambiguity is to be avoided, not only 
ambiguity of the kind discussed above, which makes 
understanding uncertain—“I heard that Chremes 
Demea struck”—but also that which, although it 
cannot confuse the sense, falls into the same verbal 
fault. So if you were to say, for example, “I saw a 
man a book writing,” although it is obvious that the 
man is writing the book, it would be a bad piece of 
composition, and you will have made it as ambiguous 
as you could.
Like Donatus, Quintilian shows that the use of two accusatives with 
a transitive verb in indirect statement merits special pedagogical 
reproach, and such syntactical ambiguitas, our oratorical instructor 
cautions, should be avoided even when a sensible audience can reliably 
deduce the correct meaning. In an earlier discussion, too, Quintilian 
uses the term amphibolia to describe a similar syntactical ambiguity, 
where “the ambiguity (amphibolia) resulting from two accusatives 
is remedied by using the ablative” (accusativi geminatione facta 
amphibolia solvitur ablativo, ut illud ‘Lachetem audivi percussisse 
Demean’ fiat ‘a Lachete percussum Demean,’ 7.9.10). Both of these 
monuments of ancient pedagogy, then, show a consistent disapproval 
of ambiguity, both as amphibolia and as ambiguitas, particularly as it 
bears on syntax. By cautioning so strongly against these ambiguous 
constructions, Quintilian and Donatus make at least this one lesson 
crystal clear: ambiguitas delenda est.
But unlike Donatus’ litany of compositional vices, Quintilian’s 
work aims to achieve more than simply teaching students the pitfalls 
of Latin grammar. It attempts to train a vir bonus dicendi peritus, 
a “good man skilled in speaking,” one who is “perfect not only in 
morals, but also in knowledge” (nec moribus modo perfectus . . . sed 
etiam scientia et omni facultate dicendi, 1.pr.18). In service to these 
broader ethical aspirations, the Institutio revisits the concept of 
ambiguitas throughout its several books, positioning the topic of 
ambiguity not just within the guidelines of grammar and syntax, but 
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also within its recommendations for forming ethically good orators, 
those who are able to plead the right cases in the courtroom with 
the right arguments. As Quintilian explains in his final book, such 
cases often rest on questions of ambiguitas, an issue that “at some 
point or another involves the discussion of equity and goodness” 
(nulla fere dici potest cuius non parte in aliqua tractatus aequi ac boni 
reperiatur, 12.2.15). He thus transposes pedantic lessons of syntax 
and composition into matters of jurisprudence and morality. By 
showing how recognizing, resolving, and leveraging ambiguity is a 
matter of ethical concern and not merely a lesson in grammar and 
composition, Quintilian recasts ambiguity as a topic that the “good 
man skilled in speaking” must master, not avoid. In fact, one’s ability 
to interpret ambiguous laws—a task that requires both technical 
knowledge and a well-developed sense of “equity” or aequitas—
constitutes the foundation of Quintilian’s moral thinking. Rather 
than defining ethics as adherence to the doctrines of Epicurus or 
the Stoic Sage, Quintilian instead argues that ethical training above 
all must refine the orator’s ability to grapple with the ambiguity of 
statutes.
Before turning to these explicitly ethical considerations at the end 
of the Instiutio, it is helpful to view Quintilian’s earlier elaboration 
of ambiguitas as a topic of rhetorical invention: not yet a meditation 
on moral philosophy, but nevertheless a fundamental recasting of 
ambiguity as a concern of interpretation rather than of composition. 
After surveying matters of early childhood education and philosophical 
issues surrounding rhetoric’s status as an art, Quintilian turns to the 
methods for devising and shaping arguments (inventio).3 Like many 
rhetorical theorists before him, including Cicero and the author 
of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Quintilian grounds much of his 
approach to inventio in status theory, a framework of invention that 
heavily influenced Roman rhetorical thought and its practitioners.4 
First elaborated in the now-lost writings of Hermagoras of Temnos 
in the second century bce, status theory attempts to articulate the 
central issue (status) of a forensic dispute by asking three progressively 
specific questions: whether something happened (the “conjectural” 
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issue, often rendered an sit?), what happened (“definitional,” quid 
sit?), and what kind of thing happened (“qualitative,” quale sit?). 
Quintilian himself illustrates the application of this framework with 
several examples, and for the issues of definition and quality, for 
instance, he sets out a hypothetical accusation of murder:
sit enim accusatoris intentio: ‘hominem occidisti’: si 
negat reus, faciat statum qui negat. quid si confitetur, 
sed iure a se adulterum dicit occisum (nempe legem 
esse certum est quae permittat)? nisi aliquid accusator 
respondet, nulla lis est. ‘non fuit’ inquit ‘adulter’: ergo 
depulsio incipit esse actoris, ille statum faciet. (3.6.17)
Let us suppose the charge made by the accuser is “You 
killed the man.” If the defendant denies it, it is he who 
produces the issue. But suppose he admits the fact, but 
says the adulterer was justifiably killed by him. (It is of 
course established that there is a law permitting this.) 
Unless the accuser makes a reply, there is no dispute. 
If he says, “He was not an adulterer,” then the rebuttal 
of the charge is now the prosecutor’s business, and he 
will produce the issue.
In this trial, the case progresses from the definitional issue of what 
the defendant did to the qualitative issue of what kind of thing was 
done. (The conjectural question of whether something happened, we 
can assume, has been settled affirmatively.) While the two parties 
agree that the defendant did kill another man, they disagree on the 
existence of mitigating conditions, since the circumstance of adultery 
would exonerate the defendant. The two sides, then, would focus on 
the kind of homicide that had taken place.
While discussions of status theory most often center around these 
three status rationales—conjecture, definition, and quality—several 
rhetorical theorists, including Quintilian, add a second collection of 
issues that situate this framework more specifically in the context 
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of forensic disputes.5 In Quintilian’s account, this second category 
includes four status legales, issues that concern the application of legal 
codes: letter and spirit (scriptum et voluntas), inference (syllogismos), 
conflicting laws (leges contrariae), and ambiguity (amphibolia or 
ambiguitas).6 Quintilian notes that the status legales are more complex 
than three status rationales, for in logical issues
itaque in eo satis est ostendisse coniecturam finitionem 
qualitatem. legalium plures sint species necesse est, 
propterea quod multae sunt leges et varia habent formas. 
alia est cuius verbis nitimur, alia cuius voluntate: alias 
nobis, cum ipsi nullam habeamus, adiungimus, alias 
inter se comparamus, alias in diversum interpretamur. 
(3.6.86–87)
it is enough to point to conjecture, definition, and 
quality. Of legal issues there are inevitably more 
varieties, because there are many laws and they have 
many forms. We rely on the letter of one, on the 
intention of another; others we harness to our cause, 
though we have no law really on our side; sometimes 
we compare one law with another, sometimes we give 
different interpretations.
In this explanation of the four varieties of status legales through the 
activities of the orator, Quintilian shows that ambiguitas bears on the 
rhetorician’s interpretation of laws that might be variously construed 
(alias in diversum interpretamur).7 No longer a mere warning to 
students about composing sentences, amphibolia and ambiguitas now 
point to a lack of clarity in legal codes and their attendant interpretive 
difficulties.
Surviving declamatory speeches from the early Roman Empire 
show that Quintilian is not alone in understanding ambiguitas as 
a central concern of rhetorical invention. We find a particularly 
helpful example in the sixth of the Declamationes Maiores of 
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Pseudo-Quintilian. Like many of the cases presented in these 
nineteen speeches, long attributed to the author of the Institutio itself, 
the sixth declamation includes at its outset the applicable statute: 
“Whoever deserts his parents in a state of disaster shall be thrown 
out without burial” (qui in calamitate parentes deseruerit, insepultus 
abiciatur, 6.pr).8 The author then summarizes the controversy at 
hand, highlighting how statutory interpretation can serve as the 
central issue in the courtroom:
qui habebat uxorem et filium, captus a piratis scripsit 
domum de redemptione. uxor flendo oculos amisit. 
Filius retinente matre profectus vicariis manibus 
redemit patrem. idem in vinculis decessit. abiectus 
in mare et appulsus ad litus patrium est eiectus. vult 
illum sepelire pater, mater prohibet. (6.pr.)
A man who had a wife and a son was captured by 
pirates and wrote home for his rescue. The wife lost 
her eyesight from crying. Even though the mother 
tried to restrain him, the son set out and freed his 
father by offering to take his father’s place. During 
his captivity, the son died. He was thrown into the 
sea, and he later drifted to his father’s homeland and 
washed ashore. The father wishes to bury the son. The 
mother prohibits it.
In the remainder of the text, the father argues for the son’s burial on 
the grounds that the son has not transgressed the statute, grounding 
his case in the law’s intent (voluntas) rather than a more pedantic 
understanding of its literal meaning (scriptum). Crucially for our 
purposes, the father forthrightly explains that the case “concerns 
the letter and the meaning of the law, whether one should rely on the 
ambiguity of the words or the adherence to its intent” (omnis nobis 
in hac†prius causa, iudices, de scripto et intellectu legis contentio est, 
utrum verborum ambiguitate an voluntatis fide standum sit, 6.11), 
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thus aligning ambiguitas with the letter of the law (scriptum), and the 
meaning found through interpretation (intellectum) with the law’s 
intent (voluntas).9
Almost paradoxically, the father argues that the apparent 
ambiguitas of the law can be circumvented if one simply interprets 
the text appropriately and avoids a slavishly literal (and therefore 
distorting) reading. While the mother, he argues, grounds her 
argument in an implausible interpretation of the law, the father 
explains how the intent of the law, itself unambiguous, disallows her 
literal understanding:
pars enim diversa id nititur parentem fuisse in 
calamitate eam, quae deserta sit; cuius rei poena 
est abici insepultum. quid tum fuerit in causa, quid 
sit postea consecutum, quomodo legem intellegere 
conveniat, subterfugit dicere, neque a vestigio scripti 
recedit, sed nuda recitatione contenta est. nos neque 
omnibus personis neque omnibus causis scriptam 
esse legem, et iuveni iustas ac necessarias recedendi 
causas, et, cui rei semper ius satis plenum est, 
contendimus, atque eo causam demittimus, ut non sit 
absolvendus nisi etiam laudandus. qui autem dubitat, 
an scripti voluntatem sequi conveniat, is mihi videtur 
quaestionem temptare†incertus. (6.12)
One side of the case contends this: that she was a 
parent in a distress, and she was abandoned; that the 
punishment for this crime is to be denied burial. But 
she dodges having to say what the motive was at that 
time, what happened afterward, and how one should 
interpret the law. And she does not step from the 
footprint of the law, but instead she is content with an 
unsophisticated reading. We maintain, however, that 
the law was not written for all people and all cases, 
and that the boy’s motives for leaving were just and 
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necessary, and that his intentions were good (a factor 
the law is very generous about), and finally, that he did 
not commit desertion. And we settle her case for this 
reason as well: the boy does not deserve acquittal, but 
actually praise. Whoever doubts whether one should 
follow the intent of the law, in fact, seems to be unsure 
of how run an investigation.
Returning to the vocabulary of interpretation (intellegere) and 
intent (voluntas), the father clarifies that the mother relies on “an 
unsophisticated reading” (nuda recitatio) and neglects to interpret the 
law sensibly. She refuses to consider interpretive questions underlying 
the case: What does it mean to leave one’s parents in calamitate? 
Does abandonment (deserere) require malicious motives? Unlike the 
compositional focus on ambiguous syntax, the ambiguitas of the 
status legales centers on the multiple approaches that one can take 
to a law, here tightly bound to the well-known opposition between 
the law’s letter and spirit (itself another of the status legales in the 
Institutio): while the mother argues for a literal understanding of the 
law’s scriptum, the father argues against the ambiguitas afforded by 
this strict reading and instead supports an adherence to the evident 
voluntas found through fair-minded interpretation.10 This case thus 
illustrates how ambiguitas extends far beyond Donatus’ purely 
grammatical concerns. The problem of ambiguity requires litigants 
to read statutes sensitively, since their words often admit multiple 
meanings, even when the syntax is clear.
Like Pseudo-Quintilian’s declamatory exercise, Quintilian’s 
Institutio also understands ambiguity as a concern for the excavation 
of statutory voluntas. As part of a discussion of the status legales 
within his treatment of oratorical dispositio in Book 7, Quintilian’s 
manual again turns its attention to ambiguitas and explains how 
two kinds of ambiguity (or at least two attitudes toward ambiguity) 
bear on rhetorical education. First, he cautions his students that one 
should not aim to resolve an ambiguous expression conclusively: “It 
is therefore futile to recommend that, in this case, we should try to 
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turn the ambiguous expression itself to our advantage, because if 
that can be done, there is no ambiguity in the first place” (ideoque 
frustra praecipitur ut in hoc statu vocem ipsam ad nostram partem 
conemur vertere: nam si id fieri potest amphibolia non est, 7.9.14). 
Quintilian here perhaps has in mind the unresolvable ambiguity 
of two accusatives in indirect statement. To return to his earlier 
example, the sentence Chremetem audivi percussisse Demean offers 
two interpretations, neither of which is conclusively or obviously 
better than the other.
Immediately following this pessimistic outlook for one’s ability to 
resolve ambiguity, however, Quintilian suggests that ambiguitas often 
requires the orator to seek out the voluntas of the law and its most 
equitable interpretation, again recasting the problem of ambiguitas as 
a conflict between the letter and the spirit of the law. Not merely an 
irreconcilable debate of unclear syntax, this second kind of ambiguity 
“rests sometimes on which is the more natural interpretation, but 
always on which is the more equitable interpretation and which the 
writer or speaker intended” (amphiboliae autem omnis erit in his 
quaestio: aliquando uter sit secundum naturam magis sermo, semper 
utrum si aequius, utrum is qui scripsit ac dixit voluerit, 7.9.15). In the 
vein of his earlier discussion of interpreting ambiguous language as 
a strategy of rhetorical inventio (in diversum interpretamur, 3.6.87), 
Quintilian again underscores in this treatment of dispositio that 
the orator should consider both “natural interpretation” as well as 
equitable interpretations of the speaker’s intent (voluerit). Hardly 
without resolution or opportunities for securing an advantage in the 
courtroom, then, this second attitude toward ambiguity invites the 
rhetorician to use his interpretive acumen to find the most sensible 
or convincing reading of the law.
The role of ambiguitas in this process of equitable interpretation 
is bound up, moreover, with the other status legales, for “it is well-
known that this treatment according to ius and aequitas is merely a 
general manifestation of the detailed doctrine of [these four issues].”11 
And Quintilian’s reference here to aequitas—the “equity” one needs 
to interpret ambiguous language fairly and correctly—signals an 
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important shift into the territory of ethical training. Not only do the 
status legales require interpretive skill; they also require the moral 
disposition of the orator who is aequus. In the final book of the 
Institutio, as we shall now see, Quintilian cements this link between 
ambiguitas and ethics in his meditations on the philosophical training 
of the ideal orator. For without ethical training, he argues, the orator 
will be a poor reader, poor interpreter, and thus poor courtroom 
advocate. When Quintilian defines aequitas as the indispensable 
foundation of the rhetorician’s ability to grapple with ambiguous 
language, therefore, he advances a key justification for one of the most 
important but least intuitive claims of his entire manual: that unless 
one is a morally good man, one can never be a skillfully good orator.
In the final book of the Institutio, Quintilian takes a more 
general approach to the aims and activities of oratory.12 As part 
of this culminating discussion, he investigates the relationship 
between philosophical learning and the practice of the orator, most 
importantly in matters of moral philosophy: “the orator must above 
all else develop his moral character by study, and undergo a thorough 
training in the honorable and the just, because without this no one 
can be either a good man or a skilled speaker” (mores ante omnia 
oratori studiis erunt excolendi atque omnis honesti iustique disciplina 
pertractanda, sine qua nemo nec vir bonus esse nec dicendi peritus 
potest, 12.2.1). Here Quintilian alludes to his requirement that no one 
can be an orator unless he is a good man, an utterly surprising claim 
when one considers that both modern and premodern eras are rife 
with examples of talented but depraved speakers.13 Apparently aware 
of how unintuitive his claim is, Quintilian devotes the whole first 
chapter of book 12 to defending it, and even in the second chapter, 
in which he turns his attention to the philosophical training of the 
rhetorician, he often returns to a defense of this major thesis. And it 
is in this second discussion that Quintilian explores the foundational 
role that one’s facility with ambiguitas has in developing this necessary 
ethical character.
As Quintilian surveys the various areas of philosophical training—
logic, ethics, and natural philosophy—that one needs to achieve 
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oratorical excellence, he underscores the importance of developing 
a facility with ambiguitas, first as a matter of logical precision and 
second as a matter of moral disposition. First turning his attention 
to training in logic, Quintilian explains how the orator must be able 
to “know the properties of every word, clear up ambiguities, unravel 
perplexities, judge falsehoods, and produce whatever inferences and 
refutations we wish” (proprietates vocis cuiusque nosse et ambigua 
aperire et perplexa discernere et de falsis iudicare et colligere ac resolvere 
quae velis oratorum est, 12.2.10).14 It is unsurprising that ambiguity 
would arise in this discussion of the orator’s logical training. Without 
the ability to evaluate the truthfulness of courtroom statements and 
make inferences from evidence, the orator would lack the crucial 
skills of the dialectician that—as Aristotle notes in the first sentence 
of his Rhetoric—are central to rhetorical practice.15
Although Quintilian includes ambiguitas in his discussion of 
the orator’s logical training, he also firmly positions facility with 
interpreting ambiguous language within ethical education, the second 
branch of the rhetorician’s philosophical learning. Returning to the 
language of status theory, Quintilian almost immediately pivots in 
his discussion of ethical training to the status rationales and the 
status legales elaborated in books 3 and 7:
iam quidem pars illa moralis quae dicitur ethice certe 
tota oratori est accommodata. nam in tanta causarum 
sicut superioribus libris diximus varietate, cum alia 
coniectura quaerantur, alia finitionibus concludantur, 
alia iura summoveantur vel transferantur, alia 
colligantur vel ipsa inter se concurrant vel in diversum 
ambiguitate ducantur. (12.2.15)
Moral philosophy, or ethics as it is called, is surely 
wholly appropriate to the orator. As I have shown 
in previous books, there is a huge variety of cases. 
We have issues of conjecture, conclusions reached 
by definition, cases dismissed on legal grounds, 
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questions of competence, cases based on inference, 
contrary laws, or ambiguities.
As he explains in the sentence that immediately follows this passage, 
Quintilian understands how these status rationales and status legales 
all involve matters of “equity and goodness” (tractatus aequi ac 
boni, 12.2.15). In fact, he underscores the central place of statutory 
interpretation in moral philosophy more generally: “Does not every 
question of law rest upon the correct sense of words or on a point 
of equity or on a conjecture about intention?” (non quaestio iuris 
omnis aut verborum proprietate aut aequi disputatione aut voluntatis 
coniectura continetur? 12.2.19). Not describing the rhetorician’s 
ethical training through the maxims of a particular philosophical 
school or an ethical authority—there is no explicit mention of Stoic 
ratio or Aristotelian deliberation here—Quintilian instead frames 
it as facility with a Hellenistic technique of rhetorical invention and 
sensitivity to ambiguous language. Without a sense of aequitas, the 
fairness needed to resolve interpretive ambiguity, and without the 
related ability to discover the spirit of the law (voluntas), the orator 
will come up short in the courtroom and lose his cases.16 In fact, when 
the orator lacks these hermeneutic and inventional skills, his practice 
will devolve into simple “loquaciousness” (loquacitas, 12.2.20), a 
symptom of language that “has either no guides to follow or false 
ones” (vel nullos vel falsos duces habeat, 12.2.20).
Quintilian elaborates the proposed relationship between ethics 
and interpretation in a later discussion of the orator’s knowledge 
of civil laws. Admitting that some points of the law are “certain” 
because they “stand firm in either writing or custom” (omne ius, 
quod est certum, aut scripto aut moribus constat, 12.3.6), Quintilian 
explains that what is “doubtful” in the law must be understood by 
the standard of equity (dubium aequitatis regula examinandum est, 
12.3.6). While an investigation of the former kind of “certain law” 
requires “knowledge, not invention” (cognitionis sunt enim, non 
inventionis, 12.3.7), because presumably there are no controversies 
surrounding these plainly understood statutes, “doubtful” points 
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invite multiple interpretations and demand careful invention and 
argument. As Quintilian explains in the sentences that follow, the 
ability to wrestle with these interpretive controversies stems from the 
equity one develops through moral training:
at quae consultorum responsis explicantur aut in 
verborum interpretatione sunt posita aut in recti 
pravique discrimine. vim cuiusque vocis intellegere 
aut commune prudentium est aut proprium oratoris, 
aequitas optimo cuique notissima. nos porro et bonum 
virum et prudentem in primis oratorem putamus. 
(12.3.7–8)
Points explained in the responses of legal consultants 
rest either on the interpretation of words or on the 
distinction between right and wrong. To understand 
the meaning of each word is either common ground 
to sensible men, or peculiar to the orator; equity is 
perfectly familiar to all good men. We believe, in 
fact, that the orator is first and foremost a good and 
prudent man.
Here Quintilian treats the “interpretation of words” and “the 
distinction between right and wrong” as parallel concerns, 
and he suggests that without the aequitas of the good man, one 
cannot “understand the meaning of each word.” (To return to our 
declamatory example from Pseudo-Quintilian for a moment, the 
Institutio here implies that the father’s ability to correctly interpret 
the concepts of “desertion” and “calamity” stems from his equity.) 
Quintilian’s discussion of ethical education in book 12, then, shows 
a certain internal consistency surrounding the place of morality in 
oratorical skill. Unlike the ambiguitas of composition, the ambiguitas 
of the status legales presents an interpretive challenge. Only with the 
correct ethical training and a refined aequitas will the orator have the 
“guides” (duces, 12.2.20) he needs to grapple with ambiguity and to 
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avoid the likelihood of courtroom defeat. Or as Quintilian lays out in 
the first sentences of this final book, the orator cannot be successful 
unless he is a good, equitable man.
By way of conclusion, I offer a third consideration of the role of 
ambiguity in rhetorical education as it relates to decorum and humor, 
topics adjacent to both morality and invention. In a discussion of 
sources of laughter, Quintilian explains that “ambigitas undoubtedly 
gives the most frequent opportunities” (cui sine dubio frequentissimam 
dat ocasionem ambiguitas, 6.3.87) for inspiring comedic responses 
in one’s audience, and he goes on to explain that “all witty speech 
consists in expressing things in a way other than the direct and 
truthful one” (omnis salse dicendi ratio in eo est, ut aliter quam est 
rectum verumque dicatur, 6.3.89). This understanding of ambiguity 
as a source of urbane comedy is not Quintilian’s own creation: earlier 
rhetorical texts including the Rhetorica ad Herennium consider 
“ambiguities as deliberate stylistic flourishes, when the intended 
double or triple meaning was seen as witty and entertaining, a 
flattering challenge to the audience’s intelligence, rather than an 
obstacle to their understanding.”17
Not all kinds of ambiguity, however, result in appropriate or 
acceptable humor, and Quintilian is careful to include a cautionary 
note about the ethics of comedic propriety:
cum sint autem loci plures ex quibus dicta ridicula 
ducantur, repetendum est mihi non omnis eos 
oratoribus convenire, in primis ex amphibolia, neque 
illa obscura quae atellanio more captant, nec qualia 
vulgo iactantur a vilissimo quoque, conversa in 
maledictum fere ambiguitate. (6.3.46–47)
Although there are many areas from which jokes 
may be drawn, I must emphasize again that they are 
not all suitable for orators: in particular any kind of 
amphibolia, either the obscure variety pursued in 
Atellan fashion, or the vulgar sort which the lowest 
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of the low bandy about, and in which the ambiguitas 
commonly turns into abuse.
Here Quintilian underscores how amphibolia and ambiguitas 
lend themselves to comedy, but also how certain instances of such 
ambiguity are beneath the moral character of the ideal orator. Such 
“vulgar” kinds of ambiguity are used by the ethically compromised 
man (vilissimus), an adjective hardly befitting the bonus homo who 
epitomizes oratorical excellence in the Institutio’s final book.18 Indeed, 
this debased kind of humor effects not the urbanitas of the learned 
rhetorician but the maledictum of the crass joker.
The role of ambiguitas in comedic decorum deserves a fuller 
treatment than it can be given here, but the term’s appearance in 
Quintilian’s discussion of humor and propriety exemplifies the 
schoolmaster’s consistent and deep interest in the ethics of linguistic 
ambiguity. As Quintilian illustrates through his allusion to the 
vilissimus man who includes questionable comedy in his speeches, 
even these more ornamental considerations of ambiguitas can reveal 
the ethical character of the orator. Perhaps, then, Quintilian sees 
the ethical significance of ambiguity not merely in its interpretive 
dimension—whether one has the proper disposition to understand 
vague statutory language—but even in the compositional concerns 
with which this chapter begins. Incompetent in his handling of 
ambiguitas, the unskilled, unethical orator will fail in both his 
reading and his writing, both his laws and his punchlines.
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eNdNoteS
1 Ars Maior III.3, cum barbarismo et soloecismo vitia duodecim 
numerantur hoc modo: barbarismus, soloecismus, acrylogia, 
cacamphaton, pleonasmos, perissologia, macrologia, tautologia, eclipsis, 
tapinosis, cacosyntheton, amphibolia . . . amphibolia est ambiguitas 
dictionis.
2 This pedagogical disapproval of ambiguity “was not seriously 
challenged until [the twentieth] century,” as modern compositional 
textbooks illustrate (Atherton 1993, 483–484).
3 In the first book of the Institutio, Quintilian urges a father to begin 
the rhetorical training of his son “as soon as he is born” (nato filio, 
1.1.1). For Quintilian’s survey of philosophical debates surrounding 
the nature and purpose and rhetoric, see Institutio 2.11–21.
4 Status theory is a rhetorical framework in which parties in a forensic 
dispute come to “a standing still” (status) in their arguments. For a 
brief history of status theory (also called stasis theory), see Dieter 1950. 
For a history of the development of status theory, see Nadeau 1959. For 
a discussion of Aristotelian influence on status theory, particularly 
regarding the forensic framework of circumstantiae, see Sloan 2010. For 
examples of discussions of status theory in Roman rhetorical manuals, 
see Cicero De Inventione I.10–16 and Rhetorica ad Herennium I.18–19.
5 As Quintilian himself notes, status theory extends to matters outside 
the courtroom, even if its primary and original application is to 
forensic oratory. See, for example, his application of this framework to 
deliberative oratory at 3.8.4–6.
6 This four-part collection of Latin terminology can be found at 3.6.88, 
where amphibolia is used instead of ambiguitas. A similar list at 3.6.66 
includes ambiguitas in place of amphibolia. The two terms seem 
interchangeable in Quintilian’s text within the context of the status 
legales.
7 Compare with Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.20: Ex ambiguo controversia 
nascitur cum scriptum duas aut plures sententias significat.
8 One recent study of the Declamationes Maiores explains that they 
include “a group of nineteen declamations composed by multiple 
authors from the end of the first through the beginning of the third 
centuries ce . . . [and] hardly fit Quintilian’s stricture that the scenario 
[of a declamatory exercise] should be plausible” (Bernstein 2013, 4). 
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The Declamationes Minores, too, often attributed to Quintilian’s own 
hand, are possibly written by another expert rhetorician: “whether 
the [author of the minor declamations] is Quintilian is a disputable 
matter, and not one, perhaps, of the highest importance. There is no 
doubt that, if he is not Quintilian, he is an avid reader of the Institutio” 
(Winterbottom 1984, xiv).
9 This sentence includes the only mention of the word ambiguitas 
in both the Declamationes Maiores and Declamtiones Minores of 
Pseudo-Quintilian.
10 For a similar treatment of statutory ambiguity in another ancient author, 
see Seneca the Elder Controversiae 1.2. In this declamatory exercise, 
Seneca’s interest in the inevitable lexical ambiguities that arise from a 
law’s compact composition parallels the desertion case from Pseudo-
Quintilian’s Declamationes Maiores. Instead of considering a dead son 
who may have deserted a grieving parent, this Senecan example looks 
to the problems surrounding an erstwhile virgin, captured by pirates 
and forced into prostitution, who later wishes to become a priestess. 
The law, however, dictates that “a priestess must be chaste and from 
chaste people, pure and of pure people” (Sacerdos casta e castis, pura, 
e puris sit, 1.2). Seneca includes one approach to the case that focuses 
on the ambiguity of the adjective castus (1.2.15). For recent work on 
the place of status theory more generally in the works of Seneca the 
Elder, see Berti 2015. For a discussion of Quintilian’s consideration of 
controversiae in his own rhetorical treatise, see Fantham 2011, 320–330.
11 Bonner 1949, 47. Bonner also reports that “the origins of [the conflict 
between ius and aequitas] are at least as old as Aristotle and the 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, and were fully formulated by Hermagoras 
long before they appeared in Cicero’s youthful De Inventione” (47). For 
another investigation of aequitas and its role in legal interpretation, 
see Eden 2005, 1–19. For an Aristotelian discussion of the relationship 
between equity and the interpretation of the law, see Nicomachean 
Ethics 5.10.
12 After the “protracted, laborious pursuit of systematic rhetorical 
learning with all its technicalities and precision” in the earlier books 
of the Institutio, “the preliminaries are finished, the boy has grown up, 
and the complete orator, the vir bonus dicendi peritus, is seen in action 
in the courts and councils of Rome” (Austin 1948, ix).
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13 For one formulation of Quintilian’s claim, see 12.1.3: “Indeed, I do 
not only say this, that he who is an orator ought to be a good man, 
but rather that a man will not even be an orator unless he is a good 
man” (neque enim tantum id dico, eum qui sit orator virum bonum 
esse oportere, sed ne futurum quidem oratorem nisi virum bonum). 
For discussions of this confounding formulation and its roots in Stoic 
thought, see Brinton 1983, Walzer 2003, and Winterbottom 1964.
14 For the meaning of perplexus related to “cryptic” or “baffling” language, 
see OLD 2b. For the meaning of aperire as “to make known or clear 
by words,” see OLD 12. Compare Tacitus Histories 2.78, where aperire 
is used to interpret the unclear language of an oracle: has ambages et 
statim exceperat fama et tunc aperiebat.
15 As Diogenes Laertius suggests in his account of the Stoic Wise Man’s 
need for dialectic, “rhetoric is essential to the Wise Man’s living the 
virtuous life,” and rhetoric and dialectic should each be understood as 
both “a science and a virtue” (Walzer 2003, 30). For Aristotle’s various 
views on ambiguity, particularly as it bears on dialectic, see Bobzein 
2008 and Hintikka 1959.
16 This facility with ambiguitas bears on the first branch of philosophical 
training, and Quintilian admits that this ethical training sounds 
similar to and overlaps with the logical training he has just prescribed 
in the previous paragraphs: “part of this set of problems overflows 
into logic, and part into ethics” (quorum pars ad rationalem, pars ad 
moralem tractatum redundat, 12.2.19).
17 Atherton 1993, 484–485. In her discussion, Atherton points to the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.67 as an example of this more positive view 
of humorous ambiguity in antiquity.
18 For Quintilian’s reference to the vilissimi as the worst authors, unfit 
even to be kept in a library, see 11.3.4–5.
